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THE RIGHT-OF-PUBLICITY CHALLENGES 
FOR TATTOO COPYRIGHTS  
Yolanda M. King* 
This Article is the third and final piece of a series of articles that examine the 
applicability of intellectual property law to tattoos. The second article in the se-
ries, The Enforcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, concluded that copy-
right owners can and should enforce their rights against users outside of the tat-
too artist-customer relationship. This Article explores a different source of 
intellectual property protection for tattoos: the right of publicity. As tattooing has 
become increasingly prevalent among celebrities, tattoos have become “one” 
with the persona of the tattoo bearer. A tattoo that carries the meaning of a ce-
lebrity tattoo bearer serves as indicia of that celebrity’s identity. The Article pro-
poses that when a tattoo becomes associated with the meaning of a celebrity’s 
identity, rather than solely retaining the message of the tattoo itself, the tattoo 
moves beyond mere protection under copyright law and acquires additional pro-
tections under the right-of-publicity laws. This transformation of intellectual 
property rights is the subject of the Article. 
Right-of-publicity laws exist in more than thirty of the states in the United 
States, in common law, by statute, or both.1 Therefore, assuming a state recogniz-
es the right of publicity, and even if a celebrity (1) owns the identity at issue (va-
lidity) and (2) shows unauthorized third-party use of the identity in a way that is 
harmful to the commercial value of the identity (infringement),2 the claim may 
conflict with First Amendment interests. This Article also considers the various 
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1  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (Thomson Reuters 
2015). 
2  See Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000) (“To allege a pri-
ma facie case for infringement of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must show both validity 
and infringement.”). 
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tests employed by courts to accommodate the conflicting interests of the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity. The Article endorses the Predominant Use 
test, which properly recognizes the prevalence of mixed commercial and expres-
sive uses for tattoos.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I am a canvas of my experiences, my story is etched in lines and shading, and 
you can read it on arms, my legs, my shoulders, and my stomach. 
 —Kat Von D, tattoo artist and television personality3 
 Michael Gerard “Mike” Tyson is known for boxing.4 He is one of the most 
famous heavyweight boxing champions, but he has also transitioned from a ca-
reer in sports to a career in entertainment. Tyson is also well-known for the tat-
too on the left side of his face, which he received during his boxing career in 
2003.5 The Maori-style tattoo has been described as “instantly recognizable”6 
                                                        
3  Quotes About Tattoos, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/tattoos 
[https://perma.cc/8NHV-2GM8] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
4  See Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times; He Rules the Planet, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/28/sports/sports-of-the-times-he-rules-the-planet.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ7S-GHPZ]; Mike Tyson, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm00055 
12/ [https://perma.cc/PWK9-JJW7] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
5  See Ray Glier, With Luster Faded, Tyson Places Career on the Line Tonight, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 22, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/22/sports/boxing-with-luster-faded-tyson-
places-career-on-the-line-tonight.html [https://perma.cc/7ZV5-KR2S]; David Whitley, Tyson 
Tattoos Himself Instead of Opponents, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 19, 2003), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2003-02-19/sports/0302190202_1_tyson-tattoo-
incredible-ink [https://perma.cc/6P3F-CKR5]. 
6  Noam Cohen, On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html. 
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and “one of the most distinctive tattoos in the nation.”7 As a result of Tyson’s 
transition from an athlete to an entertainer, the tattoo has not only appeared in 
boxing matches but also has been featured in films,8 television programs,9 and 
other media.10  
 Due in part to its notoriety and popularity, Tyson’s facial tattoo was the 
subject of the lawsuit Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.11 S. Victor 
Whitmill, a tattoo artist, claimed that Warner Bros. infringed his copyright in 
his creation, the “original and distinctive tattoo” applied to Tyson’s face, based 
upon the production company’s unauthorized12 copying of the tattoo onto the 
face of the actor Ed Helms13 in its motion picture The Hangover Part II,14 as 
well as the reproduction, distribution, and display of the tattoo in connection 
with the advertising and promotion of the movie.15 Warner Brothers argued that 
                                                        
7  Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
Inc., No. 4:11-cv-752, 2011 WL 2038147 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed, No. 4:11-
CV-752 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Whitmill Complaint]. 
8  Mike Tyson Biography, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/mike-tyson-9512980 
[https://perma.cc/A3FY-DLD6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
9  Id.; Mike Tyson, supra note 4. 
10  Jon Swartz, Mike Tyson Promises Knockout with New Interactive Boxing App, USA 
TODAY: TECHNOLOGYLIVE (Mar. 14, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://content.usato 
day.com/communities/technologylive/post/2011/03/mike-tyson-promises-knockout-with-
new-interactive-boxing-app-1/1 [https://perma.cc/GJ8E-7HML]. See generally Yolanda M. 
King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129 
(2013) [hereinafter Protection]. This Article was the first of a series of articles to examine 
the applicability of copyright law to tattoos; it addressed the copyrightability of tattoos and 
concluded that tattoos are subject to copyright protection. Id. The second piece of a series of 
articles to examine the applicability of copyright law to tattoos analyzed the ownership and 
enforcement of tattoo copyrights. See generally Yolanda M. King, The Enforcement Chal-
lenges for Tattoo Copyrights, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29 (2014) [hereinafter Enforcement].  
11  Whitmill Complaint, supra note 7. 
12  Id. at 1–2. The court concluded that the facts were largely uncontested and that “[n]either 
Tyson nor Warner Brothers sought approval from Whitmill [to reproduce the tattoo] before 
either movie.” Transcript of May 24 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 2011 WL 118119138 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2011) (No. 4:11-
CV-752-CDP) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript]. Further, the court determined that Whitmill 
had not granted Warner Bros. a license, implied or otherwise, to “use the tattoo.” Id. at 4. 
13  See Verified Answer to Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 6, Whitmill 
v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-CV-752-CDP, (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
Warner Bros. Answer] (“Warner Bros. states that Mr. Tyson appeared, with Mr. Tyson’s tat-
too, in the first HANGOVER movie, as well as in an advertising poster for the first HANGOVER 
movie, and that thousands of images of Mr. Tyson, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, have appeared 
in magazines, on television and on the internet since February 10, 2003.”). Warner Bros. 
admitted that Tyson’s tattoo and the tattoo appearing on actor Ed Helms’ face in The Hango-
ver Part II are similar but denied that there was any copyrightable expression in Tyson’s tat-
too or that the tattoo on Helm’s face was pirated. Id. 
14  See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 7. 
15  Id. 
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the use of the tattoo was a parody of the tattoo.16 However, as I noted in my se-
cond article concerning the applicability of copyright law to tattoos, The En-
forcement Challenges for Tattoo Copyrights, such use was not commentary on 
the tattoo itself but commentary on Mike Tyson.17 The effectiveness of the par-
ody hinged upon the audience’s recognition of the meaning of Tyson’s tattoo as 
a part of Tyson’s personality—aggression, masculinity, and strength—and the 
juxtaposition of that meaning with the tattoo on the face of Ed Helms’s charac-
ter in The Hangover Part II. Warner Brothers chose to use the tattoo because 
the tattoo now conveyed qualities associated with Mike Tyson’s likeness. This 
Article asserts that Mike Tyson’s tattoo has now taken on the meaning of Mike 
Tyson’s identity, and therefore, the tattoo has become a part of his persona. 
Thus, the copyrighted work of S. Victor Whitmill has been transformed into a 
protectable part of Mike Tyson’s identity.  
 Further, this Article analyzes the potential enforcement of the rights, under 
state right-of-publicity laws (defined hereinafter), that would protect a tattoo 
associated with the identity of a celebrity. For example, what if an online ven-
dor sold T-shirts, hats, and watches with a reproduction of the tattoo displayed 
on those products? What if a fragrance company decided to sell a perfume with 
the tattoo featured prominently on the bottle? Or, what if a film producer re-
leased a film featuring a male superhero that displayed Mike Tyson’s tattoo on 
the front of his costume and sold promotional products featuring that same tat-
too? These hypothetical scenarios are a few ways in which third parties might 
use a celebrity’s tattoo in order to promote, advertise, and ultimately sell a 
product. Furthermore, this Article asserts that these instances of tattoo use, 
whether the use of an image of Tyson’s face, which displays the tattoo, or the 
use of the facial tattoo alone, would infringe Tyson’s right of publicity. 
 Generally, the author of a work is the owner of the copyright in that work.18 
Therefore, if a tattoo bearer is an author, or coauthor, of a tattoo, then the tattoo 
bearer owns, or co-owns, the copyright in the tattoo.19 However, copyright 
ownership by tattoo bearers is less common than copyright ownership by tattoo 
artists because courts require the contribution of copyrightable subject matter 
                                                        
16  See Hearing Transcript, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that “[the reproduction] did not com-
ment on the artist’s work or have any critical bearing on the original composition.”). 
17  See Enforcement, supra note 10, at 60 n.180. While one might opine that Warner Broth-
ers’ use of Tyson’s facial tattoo commented on the absurdity of tattooing an image on one’s 
face, such use still did not comment on or parody the tattoo itself. 
18  17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in 
the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in 
the work.”). An exception to the general rule is the work made for hire doctrine. Under the 
work made for hire doctrine, the author of the work is “the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared.” Id. 
19  Id. 
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by the copyright owner or co-owner.20 In The Enforcement Challenges for Tat-
too Copyrights, I encourage owners of copyrights in tattoos (who most often 
will be the tattoo artists who create and ink the tattoos on the celebrities’ bod-
ies) to vigilantly enforce their rights against parties outside of the tattoo artist-
client relationship.21 However, in many instances, copyright owners, especially 
tattoo artists, may not assert their rights in their works.22 While tattoo art-
ists/copyright owners may have copyright infringement claims against such 
third parties, there are other persons who may have other claims against third 
parties, notably right-of-publicity claims by someone like Mike Tyson. Even in 
the absence of a copyright-infringement claim, a celebrity should have a right-
of-publicity claim, and the celebrity should be able to pursue a third party’s 
violation of that right.23 
 The right of publicity “prevents the unauthorized commercial use of an in-
dividual’s name, likeness or other recognizable aspects of one’s persona.”24 The 
individual has the exclusive right to license the use of his or her identity for 
commercial purposes.25 More than half of the states in the United States recog-
nize the right of publicity, in common law, by statute, or both.26 Generally, 
                                                        
20  See Enforcement, supra note 10, at 38 (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 
1061, 1070–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing that the majority of courts have adopted the “cop-
yrightability test,” which requires that each contribution to the work be copyrightable, in 
evaluating whether one’s contributions to a copyrighted work amount to authorship)). 
21  See id. at 33. 
22  See Protection, supra note 10, at 138 (“The paucity of tattoo copyright cases and the ab-
sence of a judicial recognition of the protectability of tattoos may further contribute to tattoo 
artists’ reluctance to seek remedies in the courtroom.”); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP 
Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 532 (2013) (observing that “on the whole, [tattoo artists] were 
reluctant to endorse reliance on the judicial system”). 
23  Other scholars have contemplated whether right-of-publicity claims are preempted by 
federal copyright law. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the 
Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 165 (2010); David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The 
Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 673–74 (1981). The 
preemption issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
24  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“One who 
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the per-
son’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liabil-
ity.”); Copyright Guidance, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Services/Copyright-law.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/58HZ-8FMQ] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).  
25  See Copyright Guidance, supra note 24; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 46. This Article will interchangeably use the terms “persona” and “identity” to refer to the 
characteristics of an individual. 
26  MCCARTHY, supra note 1. (“ At the time of this writing, courts have expressly recognized 
the right of publicity as existing under the common law of 21 states. Of those, eight also 
have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of publicity. In addition, ten 
states have statutes which, while some are labeled ‘privacy’ statutes, are worded in such a 
way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied in those statutes. Thus, at the 
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state right-of-publicity laws allow a plaintiff to recover upon a showing that an 
item of commerce associated with his or her identity has economic value.27 
Right-of-publicity laws have been extended to cover references to a persona 
such as voice, name, photograph, likeness, signature phrase, and fictional char-
acter.28 Other intellectual-property-law scholars have contemplated the possibil-
ity of a person’s identity to encompass images incorporated into a work of art 
on a person’s body.29 Further, it has been recognized that the celebrity persona 
carries a meaning that enables the sale of products and services associated with 
that meaning.30 Thus, it is plausible that a celebrity could bring a right-of-
publicity claim based on appropriation of his or her identity, even if the ex-
ploited part of the identity is the celebrity’s tattoo. 
 This Article is the third and final piece of a series that examines the ap-
plicability of intellectual-property law to tattoos. It will analyze the intersection 
of copyright and right-of-publicity laws in circumstances similar to the afore-
mentioned hypothetical instances, and then it will weigh a celebrity’s right-of-
publicity interests against free-speech interests.  
 Part I of the Article begins with the conclusion reached in the first article in 
this series regarding the applicability of copyright law to tattoos—namely, tat-
toos meet the requirements of copyrightability under federal copyright law, the 
Copyright Act of 1976.31 It also examines how tattoos are unique subject matter 
that moves from the protection of copyright law to the protection of right-of-
publicity laws.  
                                                                                                                                 
time of this writing, under either statute or common law, the right of publicity is recognized 
as the law of 31 states.”) 
27  4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS 
& MONOPOLIES § 22.32 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed. 2015) (“According to much authority, in 
order to recover for a violation of the right of publicity, a plaintiff must show that associating 
an item of commerce with his or her identity has economic value.”); see also Rogers v. Gri-
maldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003–04 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The common law right of publicity, where it 
has been recognized, grants celebrities an exclusive right to control the commercial value of 
their names and to prevent others from exploiting them without permission.”). 
28  ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 27.  
29  Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property 
Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 98, 137 (2003). 
30  Michael Madow, Private Ownership of a Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 185 (1993). While Professor Madow recognizes the celebrity 
persona carries a meaning that enables the sale of commodities associated with that meaning, 
he concludes a celebrity is not solely responsible for cultivating that meaning, and therefore, 
criticizes a celebrity’s exclusive ownership or control of the economic value in the persona. 
Id. at 185–96. 
31  See Protection, supra note 10, at 132 (concluding previously in The Challenges “Facing” 
Copyright Protection for Tattoos that tattoos can meet the 1976 Act’s requirements of a cop-
yrightable work—some tattoos are original, many, if not most, are fixed in a tangible medi-
um of expression, and, the useful article doctrine does not preclude copyrightability of this 
type of pictorial work). 
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 Part II first acknowledges the prevalence of tattooing among celebrities and 
professional athletes32 and discusses the relevance of right-of-publicity laws in 
light of the growing number of high-profile tattoo bearers. It then considers the 
categorization of celebrities’ tattoos as indicia of their identity. Tattoos fall un-
der the broad scope of one’s identity, and therefore, this Article posits they 
should be protected by some states under right-of-publicity or right-of-privacy 
laws. 
 In Part III, the Article examines the prevailing tests for balancing the right 
of publicity against the First Amendment—the Rogers test, which was first em-
ployed in the context of the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of an expres-
sive work in Rogers v. Grimaldi,33 the “Transformative Use” test for expressive 
works under Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup,34 the “Relatedness” test of the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,35 and the “Predominant Use” test 
adopted in Doe v. TCI Cablevision36 from a balancing approach proposed by 
intellectual property practitioner Mark S. Lee,37 and supported by the proposed 
“mixed or blended promotional/expressive uses” test articulated by Professor 
                                                        
32  This Article will refer to celebrities and professional athletes as “celebrities.” It acknowl-
edges the ever-increasing possibility that non-professional athletes, such as collegiate ath-
letes, may fall into this category too. Modern technology can transform anyone into a celeb-
rity, but the “traditional” celebrity is the subject of this Article. See William K. Smith, 
Saving Face: Adopting a Right of Publicity to Protect North Carolinians in an Increasingly 
Digital World, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2065, 2066 (2014). A celebrity has been defined as a “famous 
or well-known person” or “merely a person whom ‘many’ people talk about or know about.” 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:2. 
33  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (1989) (employing a two-part test and con-
cluding that the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of the film “Ginger and Fred” is “clearly 
related to the content of the movie and is not a disguised advertisement for the sale of goods 
or services or a collateral commercial product.”). 
34  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001). (“In sum, 
when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or her work, he or she may 
raise as affirmative defense that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as 
it contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive 
primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”) 
35  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“[I]f 
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the 
identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other’s identity in ad-
vertising.”). 
36  Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
37  Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free 
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 485, 500 (2003). (“If a product is being 
sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity, that prod-
uct should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amend-
ment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other 
circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an 
expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater 
weight. Such an approach does justice to both the expressive and property interests.”) 
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Lateef Mtima.38 This Part also analyzes the application of those tests to existing 
and potential uses of tattoos and recommends the use of the Predominant Use 
test (or mixed or blended uses test, which is a different articulation of the Pre-
dominate Use test) when balancing right-of-publicity and First Amendment in-
terests in cases concerning the publicity rights of a celebrity tattoo bearer. 
While advancing a right-of-publicity claim in connection with an expressive 
use of a copyrighted work raises First Amendment concerns,39 courts should 
avoid an “either/or characterization”40 of uses of “persona tattoos”41 in the de-
termination of whether the use of the tattoo is expressive or commercial.42  
I.   COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS 
Copyright law is exclusively federal law,43 and tattoos appear to meet the 
requirements of copyrightability, as they are “original works of authorship 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression” as required by Section 102(a) of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.44 Some tattoos meet the requisite originality of federal 
copyright law,45 and most tattoos are fixed, either in the traditional form of pa-
per, such as sketches or drawings, on the unconventional (at least under copy-
                                                        
38  Lateef Mtima, Protecting the Rights of Amateur Athletes: Transforming the Judicial Tests 
for Balancing Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP. 
154, 161 (2012) (asserting that “a socially balanced assessment of the competing interests” 
requires that courts assess the social purposes at issue and balance the interests of the parties 
in order to determine whether there should any remuneration to the plaintiff). This Article 
agrees with Mtima’s position that the issue is one of allocation of rewards from exploitation 
of an individual’s persona. This type of assessment is preferred to an “all or nothing” ap-
proach that places the right of publicity at odds with the First Amendment and results in “all 
or nothing” recovery for the plaintiff (here, the tattoo bearer). 
39  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977) (recognizing indi-
vidual’s right of publicity trumps media’s First Amendment concerns when television station 
broadcasts entertainer’s act, without his consent, in its entirety). 
40  Mtima, supra note 38, at 162 (“The technological advances of the past century have made 
possible a wide variety of new commercial uses for individual personas and other IP rights, 
and ‘either/or’ characterizations of such uses as publicity rights infringements or legitimate 
First Amendment expressions are increasingly unhelpful.”). 
41  For purposes of brevity, I will refer to a tattoo that has become “one” with the persona of 
the tattoo bearer as a “persona tattoo.” Such tattoos are distinguishable from tattoos that con-
tinue to solely represent a meaning independent of the tattoo bearers. 
42  Mtima, supra note 38, at 162. 
43  17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that 
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are 
governed exclusively by this title.”). 
44  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
45  Perzanowski, supra note 22, at 525 (“A tattoo, like any other original work fixed in a tan-
gible medium, is protected by copyright law.”). 
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right law) medium of human skin, or both.46 Therefore, at least some tattoos are 
protectable subject matter under federal copyright law. In addition, as conclud-
ed in The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, the fact that 
a tattoo artist’s work is conveyed through the medium of the human body does 
not preclude nor disqualify it from serving as a protectable medium of expres-
sion under copyright law.47 Thus, this choice of medium does not affect the 
copyrightability of the work.48  
However, when the medium is the body of a celebrity, and the tattoo be-
comes more associated with the celebrity tattoo bearer’s identity than the mes-
sage, if any, of the work (whether it be aesthetic or political, for example), then 
the copyrighted work moves from the copyright realm into subject matter of the 
right of publicity. In such instances, the tattoo on a celebrity carries the mean-
ing of the tattoo bearer, thereby serving as indicia of the celebrity’s identity. 
For a celebrity to establish unauthorized use of his or her recognizable identity, 
the use of the identity must be “sufficient to identify the person whose identity 
the defendant is alleged to have appropriated,”49 and this requirement would be 
met in instances of commercial use of a tattoo prominently displayed on the 
body of a celebrity.50 Thus, the tattoo itself, born out of copyright law, would 
now be subject to right-of-publicity laws. A celebrity could then file a lawsuit 
alleging infringement of his or her right of publicity based on a third party’s 
commercial use of the tattoo. Because the practice of tattooing among celebri-
ties is commonplace,51 such lawsuits are likely in the future. 
                                                        
46  Id. at 526 (“Tattooers occasionally ink an image freehand directly on a client’s skin But 
more often, they create a detailed line drawing of the tattoo design on paper.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
47  See Protection, supra note 10, at 151–52. 
48  Perzanowski, supra note 22, at 568 (“[T]attoo designs, whether fixed on paper or on hu-
man skin, are works embraced by copyright.”). 
49  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). The 
Restatement elaborates that “in the case of an alleged visual likeness, the plaintiff must be 
reasonably identifiable from the photograph or other depiction.” Id. 
50  It is less likely that a tattoo fixed on a covered or private part of a celebrity’s body would 
become an identifiable part of the celebrity’s persona because it would not be in public view. 
However, this Article posits that, even if a tattoo does not meet the requisite level of origi-
nality for copyright protection (such as a basic geometric shape or unoriginal arrangement of 
geometric shapes), it may become an identifiable part of a celebrity’s persona. Therefore, in 
such likely limited instances, an uncopyrightable tattoo could still be protected by right-of-
publicity laws. 
51  Ramin Setoodeh, Kat Von D: Are Celebrities Driving Tattoo Culture?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 
2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/kat-von-d-are-celebrities-driving-tattoo-culture-
69897 [https://perma.cc/MFS3-SF3W] (discussing growth in popularity of tattoos among ce-
lebrities). 
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II.   APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TO TATTOOS 
 The right of publicity is a state-law intellectual-property right.52 The right 
is now recognized by more than thirty states in the United States.53 The Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines the right of publicity: 
Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person’s Identity: The Right of 
Publicity 
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using 
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for pur-
poses of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stat-
ed in §§ 48 and 49.54 
 
A succinct definition of the right of publicity is “the inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”55 It has been 
characterized as “our last, best hope of preventing others from profiting our 
identities without our permission.”56  
 The right of publicity originates from the right of privacy,57 and it was first 
recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.58 Judge 
Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit coined the term “right of publicity” in an 
effort to distinguish it from the right of privacy.59 He stated: 
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in 
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his pic-
ture, and that such a grant may validly be made “in gross,” i.e., without an ac-
companying transfer of a business or of anything else. . . . 
 This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common knowledge 
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from hav-
ing their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel 
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, 
                                                        
52  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3. 
53  Id. at § 6:3. 
54  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). Comment a 
further delineates the right of publicity: “The appropriation of another’s identity for purposes 
of trade can result in injury to both commercial and personal interests. This Restatement 
deals with rules affording relief against unfair methods of competition, and the rules stated in 
this Topic are therefore limited to the redress of commercial injuries. The interest protected 
by these rules is often described as the ‘right of publicity.’ ” Id. cmt. a; see also ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 930 (6th Cir. 2003). 
55  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3; see also MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3:2 (Thomas Reuters 2015) (describing the right of publici-
ty as “an individual’s right to control commercial exploitation of his or her identity”). 
56  LEE, supra note 55, § 3:1. 
57  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7. 
58  Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
59  Id. 
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popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, 
trains and subways.60 
 Similar to the right of privacy, the right of publicity protects one’s “interest 
in personal dignity and autonomy.”61 However, unlike the right of privacy, 
which is concerned with harm to an individual’s personal interests,62 the right 
of publicity protects against damage to the commercial value of an individual’s 
identity.63 The rationale for the right of publicity is the protection of the eco-
nomic value of a person’s identity, including the invested “time, effort, and ex-
pense” to cultivate such value.64 As a result of such protection, an individual is 
incentivized to invest in the development of his or her identity, which ultimate-
ly benefits the public.65 The Supreme Court likened its rationale behind right-
of-publicity protection to the underlying bases for patent and copyright laws.66 
Other intellectual-property-law scholars have analyzed the additional rationale 
for the right of publicity—the natural or property rights in one’s name and like-
ness.67 
 In order to establish a prima facie case of infringement of one’s right of 
publicity, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of the recognizable identity at 
issue (validity) and (2) unauthorized third party use of the identity in a way that 
is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of the celebrity’s identity (in-
fringement).68 A plaintiff does not need to prove that the use caused damage to 
                                                        
60  Id. 
61  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
62  See id. cmt. a (“Relief is also generally available under the law of torts for injuries to per-
sonal interests caused by the unauthorized commercial use of another’s identity. The protec-
tion of these personal interests is often described as an aspect of the ‘right of privacy.’ ”); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:67 (“The critical difference is the nature of the right invaded: 
either psyche or pocketbook. Once this distinction is accepted, the ‘personal’ or ‘property’ 
label follows easily, with the ‘right of privacy’ being a ‘personal right’ and the ‘right of pub-
licity’ being a ‘property right.’ ”). 
63  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (ex-
plaining that while “[t]he appropriation of another’s identity for purposes of trade can result 
in injury to both commercial and personal interests,” the right of publicity rules are limited to 
protection of commercial interests). 
64  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977). 
65  Id. at 576. 
66  Id. 
67  Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, and Identity: The Purpose and 
Scope of the Right of Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 194 
(2015). 
68  Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000) (“To allege a prima 
facie case for infringement of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must show both validity and 
infringement.”). 
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his identity in order to establish a claim for liability and obtain injunctive relief; 
damage is presumed from the unauthorized use.69 
 While the right of publicity is not solely the right of a celebrity,70 the ma-
jority of reported right-of-publicity decisions involve a celebrity.71 The identity 
of a celebrity carries more significant commercial value than a private individ-
ual’s identity, and therefore, third parties are more likely to use a celebrity’s 
identity in advertising, merchandise, and even in expressive or artistic works.72 
The “associative value” of a celebrity’s identity positively impacts the sale of 
goods and services, and such economic value is diminished by unauthorized 
use.73 As a result, a celebrity must vigorously protect his right of publicity in 
order to preserve the economic value of his identity. Hence, a right of publicity 
lawsuit is often viewed as the “celebrity law suit.”74  
A.   Prevalence of Tattooed Celebrities 
The practice of tattooing has become commonplace in the entertainment 
and sports industries.75 Tattooed celebrities have elevated the visibility and at-
tractiveness of tattoos.76 Consequently, celebrities have played a significant role 
in the growth of tattooing in popular culture.77 The mainstreaming of tattooing 
has led to the commercialization of tattoos, transforming tattoo bearers and 
                                                        
69  Petty v. Chrysler Corp., 799 N.E.2d 432, 441–42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“A claimant alleg-
ing misappropriation of identity need not prove actual damages, because the court will pre-
sume damages if someone infringes another’s right to control his identity.”). 
70  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 (“The right of publicity is not merely a legal right of the 
‘celebrity,’ but is a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial use of identity and 
persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of an unpermitted taking.”). 
71  Id. § 4:2 (defining a celebrity as a “famous or well-known person” or “merely a person 
whom ‘many’ people talk about or know about”). 
72  Id. § 4:3. 
73  Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protect-
ing the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 857 (1995); Lee, supra note 
37, at 480 (“Allowing uncompensated third-party use also devalues the property and allows 
unjust enrichment in violation of the owner’s property rights.” (citing Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
74  Smith, supra note 32. 
75  Wendy Haywood et al., Who Gets Tattoos? Demographic and Behavioral Correlates of Ev-
er Being Tattooed in a Representative Sample of Men and Women, 22 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 
51, 51 (2012) (“Once the domain of gangs, prisoners, and specific subcultures, tattoos are 
now regularly seen on celebrities, athletes, and middle-class young people.”); Mary Kosut, 
An Ironic Fad: The Commodification and Consumption of Tattoos, 39 J. POPULAR CULTURE 
1035, 1037–38 (2006) (observing prevalence of tattooed persons in the entertainment indus-
try, including television personalities in soap operas, sitcoms, and reality television shows, 
movie actors and actresses, musicians, and professional athletes); Setoodeh, supra note 51 
(discussing growth in popularity of tattoos among celebrities). 
76  See Kosut, supra note 75, at 1038 (“At the very least, the celebrity tattoo phenomenon 
contributes to new understandings of tattoo and elevates tattoo’s cultural status.”). 
77  Id. 
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their accompanying tattoos into valuable products.78 Tattoos are used in adver-
tising to sell products,79 and celebrities appear willing to be advertisements 
themselves, bearing tattoos of products names and logos.80 For example, an ad-
vertising executive proposed the idea of professional basketball players wear-
ing temporary tattoos to promote various products.81 Although the National 
Basketball Association (“NBA”) officials rejected the proposal, NBA player 
Stephon Marbury expressed that he would have considered it.82 Thus, celebri-
ties, advertisers, and consumers alike recognize the economic value of celebri-
ties and their tattoos. 
B.   Tattoos as Indicia of Identity 
At the inception of the right of publicity, the interpretation of identity was 
limited to one’s name and likeness.83 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition includes the appropriation of “other indicia of identity” as an infringe-
ment of the right of publicity.84 It has been observed that certain people possess 
other indicia of personality,85 and therefore, the right of publicity can be violat-
ed without the use of one’s name or likeness.86 A number of celebrities possess 
other indicia of identity, and a tattoo prominently fixed on the body of one of 
those celebrities could become an identifiable part of the celebrity’s identity. 
Relevant evidence of identifiability “includes the nature and extent of the iden-
tifying characteristics used by the defendant, the defendant’s intent, the fame of 
                                                        
78  Id. at 1039; see also Enforcement, supra note 10, at 30 (noting that plaintiff tattoo artists 
filed lawsuits due to primary concerns about reproduction of their works by third-party com-
panies for the commercialization of products, i.e. a film, athletic shoe, and video game). 
79  Kosut, supra note 75, at 1039 (“Whether designated as a sign of rebellion, youth, trendi-
ness, or some amalgam of coolness, tattoos assist in selling products—from vodka to cars. 
Thus, tattoo is used to sell a product and is simultaneously a product to be consumed.”). 
80  Id. 
81  Id; see also Stephen M. McKelvey, Commercial “Branding”: The Final Frontier or 
False Start for Athletes’ Use of Temporary Tattoos as Body Billboards, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS 
SPORT 1, 3 (2002); John Vukelj, Post No Bills: Can the NBA Prohibit Its Players from Wear-
ing Tattoo Advertisements?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 507, 509 (2005). 
82  Kosut, supra note 75, at 1039; Vukelj, supra note 81, at 515. 
83  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); LEE, supra 
note 55; Halpern, supra note 73, at 859. 
84  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
85  Id. cmt. d (“The use of other identifying characteristics or attributes may also infringe the 
right of publicity, but only if they are so closely and uniquely associated with the identity of 
a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate the commercial 
value of the person’s identity.”); Halpern, supra note 74, at 860 (“But, of course, for certain 
people, there may be other indicia of the unique persona; certain traits, characteristics, man-
nerisms, or even paraphernalia may be peculiarly attached to the individual so as uniquely to 
evoke that individual.”). 
86  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he case 
law has borne out his insight that the right of publicity is not limited to the appropriation of 
name or likeness.”). 
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the plaintiff, evidence of actual identification made by third persons, and sur-
veys or other evidence indicating the perceptions of the audience.”87 Courts 
have expanded the scope of identity to encompass a wide variety of characteris-
tics of a person,88 such as style,89 voice and sound-a-like,90 distinctive phrases,91 
and more.92  
Tattoos are powerful visual images, and some are already associated with 
the identities of celebrities, such as Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo, Angelina Jolie’s 
arm tattoo of the geographical coordinates of the birth places of her children 
and husband Brad Pitt,93 and Rasheed Wallace’s arm tattoo of an Egyptian-
themed depiction of his family.94 The unauthorized commercial use of tattoos 
will continue to grow not only due to the aforementioned increasing prevalence 
                                                        
87  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
88  ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 27 (observing that some jurisdictions have extended the 
right of publicity to “include many types of references to a persona including voice, name, 
photograph, likeness, business building, picture of a unique article, signature phrase, fiction-
al character, etc.”) (citations omitted). 
89  Id. 
90  Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that actress and 
singer Bette Midler made a sufficient showing to defeat summary judgment that defendants’ 
use of a sound-a-like singer in an automobile commercial appropriated part of Midler’s iden-
tity—her voice); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992). 
91  Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that defendant violated the right of publicity of former host of the television program “The 
Tonight Show” John Carson because defendant used the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” the open-
ing statement for Carson’s introduction on the weekday nightly television program, in con-
nection with the sale of portable toilets). 
92  Motschenbacher v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (con-
cluding that, even though the likeness of racing car driver Lothar Motschenbacher was not 
visible in the cigarette commercial and defendant made changes to the race car featured in 
the commercial, Motschenbacher had a protectable interest in his identity because the driver 
in the commercial was identifiable as Motschenbacher in light of the distinctive decorations 
on the car). 
93  Angelina Jolie is known for her films, her humanitarian work, and her tattoos. VANISHING 
TATTOO, http://www.vanishingtattoo.com/tattoo_facts.htm [https://perma.cc/ES2V-QTZ7] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (“Angelina’s number, choice, and types of tattoos rank the high-
est in the celebrity category [of tattoo searches].”). The tattoo on Angelina Jolie’s left arm 
has been referred to as “one of the most infamous celebrity tattoos.” 30 Celebrity Tattoos: 
Your Favorite Good, Bad & Ugly Ink, HUFFINGTON POST: HUFFPOST CELEBRITY (Jul. 16, 
2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/celebrity-tattoos_n_3348545 
.html [https://perma.cc/5BSF-DPJH] (displaying photographs of public’s favorite celebrity 
tattoos). 
94  Rasheed Wallace’s right arm tattoo was the subject of a lawsuit filed by tattoo artist Mat-
thew Reed, who alleged that Nike and advertising agency Weiden + Kennedy directly in-
fringed his copyright in the tattoo in the creation of a Nike advertising campaign on televi-
sion and the internet. See Protection, supra note 10, at 142. “The advertisement included a 
close-up of the tattoo and featured the tattoo being created by a computerized simulation 
with a voice-over from Wallace describing and explaining the meaning of the tattoo.” Id. at 
142–43. Arguably, the defendants in that lawsuit selected the tattoo, and Wallace’s explana-
tion of it, as the centerpiece of the commercial, because it had become a part of his identity. 
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of tattooing among the entertainment and sports industries but also due to the 
ability of tattoos to conjure up the marketing power of their celebrity tattoo 
bearers. 
III.   FIRST AMENDMENT AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TESTS 
 There is a tension between the expressive rights embodied in the First 
Amendment and the property rights embodied in right-of-publicity laws.95 
Courts often “weigh the state’s interest in protecting a plaintiff’s property right 
to the commercial value of his or her name and identity against the defendant’s 
right to free speech.”96  
 Courts have used various tests for balancing publicity rights against First 
Amendment interests when a plaintiff brings a right-of-publicity lawsuit, in-
cluding the Transformative Use test, the Rogers test, and the Predominate Use 
test.97 However, the majority of courts employ the Transformative Use test.98 
This Article asserts that the Predominant Use test is the proper balancing ap-
proach for the evaluation of blended expressive and commercial uses of an 
identity. The Predominant Use test will most effectively accommodate the con-
flicting publicity and free-speech interests in right-of-publicity cases, especially 
in cases concerning a “persona tattoo.” 
                                                        
95  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is an inherent 
tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First 
Amendment.”); Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001) 
(“The tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment is highlighted by re-
calling the two distinct, commonly acknowledged purposes of the latter.”); Lee, supra note 
37, at 479. 
96  Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931; 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Comedy III Prods., 
Inc., 21 P.3d at 806; Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478 (Cal. 2003). 
97  I am indebted to Professor David Rubenstein, a participant in the 2014 Washington Uni-
versity Law School’s Junior Faculty Regional Workshop, for the valuable suggestion that 
perhaps the right of publicity/First Amendment balancing test might be viewed through a 
constitutional conflict preemption lens. This perspective is intriguing because it presents a 
novel means of scrutiny of the relationship between the right of publicity and First Amend-
ment, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. However, an examination of the preemption 
of right-of-publicity claims in general, and this suggestion in particular, may be fitting for 
future analysis. 
98  Gervais & Holmes, supra note 67, at 212 (“The transformative use test is widely used by 
courts attempting to balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”); see also No 
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal Rptr. 3d 397, 400–01 (Ct. App. 2011). See gener-
ally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing cases that also adopt 
the Transformative Use test). 
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A.   Transformative Use Test 
 In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, defendants, artist Gary Sad-
erup and Gary Saderup, Inc. (“Saderup”), sold lithographs and T-shirts bearing 
the likenesses of the Three Stooges, a former comedy act of deceased person-
alities whose postmortem rights were owned by plaintiff Comedy III Produc-
tions.99 The image of the Three Stooges on the lithographs and T-shirts was 
based upon a charcoal drawing previously created by Saderup.100 After the trial 
and appellate courts found for Comedy III, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment of the appellate court.101 In doing so, the court articulated 
the “Transformative Use test.”102 
The California Supreme Court derived the “Transformative Use” test from 
one of the fair use factors of federal copyright law.103 It described its test: 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a ce-
lebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without 
adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in pro-
tecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imita-
tive artist.  
On the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative ele-
ments, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is 
also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of 
publicity.104 
 The California Supreme Court elaborated that 
[a]nother way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one 
of the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, or whether 
the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the 
work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a celeb-
rity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s 
own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.105 
 This lengthy explanation of the test, combined with additional characteriza-
tions of the test set forth in the decision, has been interpreted to include five 
factors: (1) whether the literal or imitative depiction adds “significant expres-
sion,” (2) whether the celebrity image is one of the “raw materials from which 
an original work is synthesized,” (3) whether the work is “primarily the de-
fendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity likeness,” (4) whether the 
“literal and imitative elements” or the “creative elements” predominate the 
work, and (5) whether the “marketability and economic value” of the work de-
                                                        
99  Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 800–01. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 801, 811. 
102  Id. at 808. 
103  Id. at 807; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
104  Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808 (citation omitted). 
105  Id. at 809. 
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rives primarily from the celebrity’s fame.106 The test is used for cases in which 
the plaintiff claims a defendant’s expressive work,107 which is protected by the 
First Amendment, infringes the plaintiff’s right of publicity.  
 Under this test, courts analyze whether the defendant sufficiently trans-
forms the plaintiff’s identity in the visual artistic work. However, this question 
is an elusive one for courts to answer. Transformativeness is highly subjec-
tive—it is in the eye of the beholder.108 The Court of Appeals of California 
found that the use of the likenesses of members of the rock band No Doubt in 
the Band Hero video game was not transformative.109 In addition, the Third and 
Ninth Circuits found non-transformative uses of the likenesses of former col-
lege football athletes Ryan Hart and Samuel Keller, respectively, in the NCAA 
Football series video games.110 The courts reached these conclusions based on 
the observations that the avatars in the video games were digital replicas of the 
celebrities.111  
 In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit distinguished the case (as well as No Doubt and Hart) from the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. DC Comics,112 which con-
cerned the use of comic book characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn based on 
famous rock star brothers Johnny and Edgar Winter.113 The In re NCAA court 
also distinguished the facts of the Court of Appeals of California’s decision in 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,114 which concerned the use of the likeness of 
singer Kierin Kirby, professionally known as “Lady Miss Kier,” as the basis for 
news reporter character Ulala (whose name Kirby alleged sounded similar to 
her “ ‘signature’ lyrical expression” “ooh la la”) in a video game.115 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the key distinction between these groups of cases was 
that the celebrities’ likenesses in Winter and Kirby were transformed into crea-
                                                        
106  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.72. 
107  Expressive works range from traditional works of art, such as paintings and sculptures to 
more modern artistic works, such as photography, comic books, cartoons, and video games. 
See id. 
108  See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Rebecca Tush-
net, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 157, 187 (2015) (noting Judge Ambro’s dissent in Hart which agreed that the Trans-
formative Use test was the proper test but disagreed that its interpretation and application 
“adds credence to the objection that transformativeness requires judges to become art crit-
ics.”). 
109  No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 410 (Ct. App. 2011). 
110  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013). 
111  Hart, 717 F.3d at 161–62; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276; No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
409–10. 
112  See generally Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
113  See generally In re NCAA, 724 F.3d 1268. 
114  See generally Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (2006). 
115  In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276–77. 
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tive, new characters in the expressive works at issue.116 The court further con-
cluded that the NCAA Football video games at issue lacked transformative 
context.117  
 Other intellectual property law scholars have criticized the No Doubt line 
of cases, arguing that the courts have eviscerated First Amendment protection 
for video games and that, unlike the California Court of Appeals’s application 
of the Transformative Use test in No Doubt, the overall transformativeness of 
the work should be considered.118 This Article asserts that the courts’ applica-
tions of the Transformative Use test are correct, but it is the wrong test for bal-
ancing First Amendment interests and right-of-publicity claims.  
 Even though the test is referred to as the “Transformative Use” test, the 
Comedy III court’s expression of the test is unclear regarding whether the court 
should consider either the depiction of the celebrity, the overall context of the 
work, or both. It is clear, however, that the test is biased against a particular 
medium of expression—video games—because the typical goal of a video 
game creator is to depict the game content based on real people and their envi-
ronments as literally as possible. If the additional “significant expression” is not 
present in the depiction of the celebrity, which usually will not be the case, or 
not present in the overall context of the game, which may not be the case, then 
the right of publicity likely trumps the First Amendment under the Transforma-
                                                        
116  Id. at 1277. 
117  Id. at 1278 (“[T]he Third Circuit agreed with us that these changes [‘the potentially trans-
formative nature of the game as a whole’ and ‘the user’s ability to alter avatar characteris-
tics’] do not render the NCAA Football games sufficiently transformative to defeat a right-
of-publicity claim.”). 
118  See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 179–80. 
Even though the avatars [in No Doubt] could be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues or to 
sing songs the real band wouldn’t ever sing, and even though the game had many other creative 
elements, the avatars were still “exact depictions” of the musicians doing what had made them 
famous: performing music. The use of highly realistic digital depictions “was motivated by a de-
sire to capitalize on the band’s fan-base,” so there was a violation of the right of publicity. This 
result can be compared to a hypothetical biography that is exact in every description and detail, 
the realism of which would plainly fail to justify liability. 
Id. at 179. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The Transformativenes Test 
for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution 
of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 32 (2003). 
When transplanted to right of publicity cases involving a conflict between a persona claimant 
and a visual artist, transformativeness does not effect that goal. Instead, it could limit the crea-
tion of new expressive works of visual art by prohibiting the reproduction and sale of copies of 
artworks unless they are clearly transformative in the right of publicity sense. Saderup’s drawing 
of the Three Stooges would clearly merit copyright protection—there was no evidence that his 
drawing did not reflect original creation. Because it was a realistic depiction of the Stooges, sell-
ing reproductions was held to be unlawful. Hence, unlike in the case of using transformativeness 
as a factor in a copyright fair use analysis, requiring transformativeness to protect visual art as 
speech may protect celebrity economic interests, but it does not further originality in the creation 
of new personae or in the creation of expressive works of authorship. 
Id. 
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tive Use test. Even if the additional “significant expression” is present in the 
overall context of the game, but the court deems the overall context of the game 
as irrelevant, then the court would likely reach the same outcome. 
 The Transformative Use test is an unpredictable balancing approach.119 
Under the Transformative Use test, courts are more likely to reach disparate de-
terminations in an analysis of the use of a celebrity’s tattoo in an expressive 
work. The multi-step test requires, among other things, an analysis of whether 
the artistic expression, or work, contains “transformative elements” or addi-
tional “significant expression” of the defendant.120 An assessment of these fac-
tors necessitates an aesthetic critique of the work and the depiction of the celeb-
rity’s likeness in it. This assessment will be particularly challenging for courts 
confronted with a persona tattoo use in light of (1) the likelihood that the use 
will be both expressive and commercial, (2) the uniqueness of the indicia of 
identity, and (3) the characterization of tattoos themselves as copyrightable 
works of art.  
B.   Rogers Test 
 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, highly acclaimed actress, dancer, and singer Ginger 
Rogers, who performed with Hollywood star Fred Astaire, claimed the defend-
ants violated her right of publicity and Lanham Act rights when they released a 
film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a fictional tale of two Italian cabaret per-
formers who imitated the famous duo.121 The Second Circuit devised the Rog-
ers test, which examines whether the use of one’s name in the title of an artistic 
work is wholly unrelated to the underlying work.122 This test was used to bal-
ance First Amendment interests against a Section 43(a) Lanham Act claim123 
and a right-of-publicity claim. The court applied the following two-part test for 
balancing falsity claims against free speech: 
 In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that bal-
ance will normally not support application of the Act [1] unless the title has no 
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, [2] if it has some artis-
                                                        
119  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.72 (“The California Supreme Court expressed the ‘trans-
formative’ test in terms that will unfortunately prove extremely difficult to predict and apply 
because it requires a court to make an aesthetic judgment about the challenged artistic use.”). 
120  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
121  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996–97 (2d Cir. 1989). 
122  Id. at 1004. 
123  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates civil liability for  
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, 
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
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tic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of 
the work.124 
 The court applied the two-part test and concluded Ginger Rogers could not pre-
vent the use of her name in the title of the fictional film.125  
 The Rogers test is the leading and most appropriate test in cases in which 
the court must balance First Amendment interests with protections of parties’ 
rights under the Lanham Act. While courts continue to apply the Rogers test to 
the use of trademarks in the titles of artistic or expressive works,126 courts have 
since extended the test to the uses of trademarks in the actual content of artistic 
works.127 However, most courts have rejected this test for right-of-publicity 
cases because it includes a falsity element,128 which is not a requirement under 
right-of-publicity laws,129 and because it lacks any evaluative criteria.130 
 For the same reasons, it is an unavailing test for right-of-publicity cases 
concerning a persona tattoo. If the celebrity’s tattoo is identifiable as indicia of 
the tattoo bearer and a third party commercially uses the celebrity’s tattoo, then 
the relationship of the tattoo to the work in which it appears is irrelevant. If rel-
evance was a factor in the balancing of the First Amendment and right-of-
                                                        
124  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
125  Id. at 1005. 
126  Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003). In Parks, the Sixth Circuit 
held that hip-hop musical group OutKast’s use of Rosa Parks’ name in the title of a song was 
“trademark use” and defendant’s use of the mark could cause consumers to falsely believe 
that Rosa Parks was affiliated with or approved of the song. Id. at 448–49. The court applied 
the Rogers test in this case. It identified the critical issue as “a determination of the artistic 
relevance of the title, Rosa Parks, to the content of the song,” which required an analysis of 
the song’s lyrics “in their entirety.” Id. at 442. According to the court, apart from the line 
“move to the back of the bus” repeated throughout, the song otherwise was not intended to 
be and was not about Rosa Parks, thus reasonable persons could find no connection between 
the use of Rosa Parks’s name in the title and the song itself. Id. at 452–53. The court chose 
the Rogers test, over “likelihood of confusion” test, the traditional test for trademark cases, 
and the “alternative avenues” test, as the proper approach for balancing First Amendment 
interests with the false advertising claim under the Lanham Act because the other two ap-
proaches did not give “adequate weight to the First Amendment interests in the case.” Id. at 
448–49. The court then applies the Rogers test to Parks’s right-of-publicity claim as well, 
without any independent analysis of or reasoning for the application of the test to the publici-
ty claim, and supplements the use of the Rogers test with support from the Restatement’s 
relatedness test. See id. at 461. 
127  E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Although this test traditionally applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, 
there is no principled reason why it ought not also apply to the use of a trademark in the 
body of the work.”); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 
490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Rogers test is “generally applicable to Lanham Act 
claims against works of artistic expression”). 
128  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:53. 
129  Parks, 329 F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of publicity claim does differ from a false advertising 
claim in one crucial respect; a right of publicity claim does not require any evidence that a 
consumer is likely to be confused.”). 
130  Lee, supra note 37, at 485. 
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publicity interests, then allowing commercial use of a celebrity’s identity be-
cause it happens to be relevant would undermine a celebrity’s (and a court’s) 
ability to protect against the exploitation of the very subject matter that the 
right of publicity was created to preserve.131 In addition, whether the public is 
misled or confused as to the source or content of the work, while critical to a 
Lanham Act claim, is unimportant to the analysis of a right-of-publicity 
claim.132 
C.   The Relatedness Test 
 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition prescribes the Relatedness 
test, which protects the use of one’s identity in an expressive work unless the 
“name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related 
to the identified person.”133 This test is representative of the breadth of the 
scope of First Amendment protection set forth in the Restatement. For example, 
the Restatement first states that “[t]he use of a person’s identity primarily for 
the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally 
actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”134 It then lists a 
multitude of uses of a person’s identity that would not “generally” infringe the 
right of publicity: (1) news reporting, whether in newspapers, magazines, or 
broadcast news; (2) entertainment and other creative works, such as novels, 
plays, or motion pictures, both fiction and nonfiction; and (3) articles published 
in fan magazines or in feature story broadcasts on an entertainment program.135 
Such overgeneralizations are not helpful in an analysis where the use of a work 
is both expressive and commercial.136 The Restatement’s broad sweep of pro-
tected activities does not amount to much of a test and swings the pendulum too 
far away from right-of-publicity interests. Further, the singular criteria of “re-
latedness” would potentially favor exploitative uses of a persona tattoo if the 
third-party user even tangentially relates the work to the celebrity. 
                                                        
131  Gervais & Holmes, supra note 67, at 213 (“The Rogers test seems to protect First 
Amendment principles at the expense of the natural rights an individual possesses in her 
identity.”). 
132  Id. at 199–200 (“Rationales that are used to justify trademark law should not be offered 
to justify the right of publicity simply because the two rights seem similar. . . . ‘[S]ome 
courts have failed to see the important distinctions and have unthinkingly imported certain 
inapplicable pieces of trademark doctrine into right of publicity cases . . . .’ ” (quoting Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2013))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“Proof of deception or consumer confusion 
is not required for the imposition of liability under this Section.”). 
133  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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 The Relatedness test has been referred to as a version of, or another name 
for, the Rogers test.137 However, courts typically have used the Relatedness test 
as support for the Rogers test or other balancing approaches instead of employ-
ing it as an independent test for balancing First Amendment and trademark in-
terests.138 The Relatedness test is not the equivalent of the Rogers test. Indeed, 
the sole criterion—whether the use is solely to attract attention to a work unre-
lated to the person—embodies the first prong of the Rogers test: relevance. The 
second prong—an examination of whether the relevant use is nevertheless an 
explicitly misleading use—is not present in the Restatement’s Relatedness test.  
 The Relatedness test alone is not the proper test for the balancing of First 
Amendment interests and right-of-publicity claims. It does not amount to much 
of a test; it protects “related” uses and lists broad categories of protected sub-
ject matter. Furthermore, the Relatedness test—whether applied as a duplicate 
or version of the Rogers test—is an inappropriate test for balancing the afore-
mentioned competing interests for the same reasons that the Rogers test is ill-
suited to do so. 
D.   Predominant Use Test 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri was the first to recognize and employ the 
“predominate use” test, adopted from the following proposed approach set forth 
                                                        
137  Thomas E. Kadri, Comment, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity 
Goes 2–0 Against Freedom of Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2014) (“Some-
times called the Rogers test, sometimes the Restatement test, it usually appears in the context 
of trademark law.”). Kadri recommends the Rogers test over the Transformative Use test 
because it is a “bright-line test.” Id. However, Kadri’s recharacterization of the Rogers test 
for right-of-publicity claims mistakenly assumes that the speech at issue (or more appropri-
ately, the use at issue) can be classified as “purely commercial” or expressive. Id. The re-
fined Rogers test would be applied to expressive, or speech that is not purely commercial, 
but the test would still require inquiries regarding whether the use is “ ‘wholly unrelated’ to 
the content of the work or is ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods or services.’ ” Id. The pitfalls of this test’s application to right-of-publicity claims are 
the same as the current Rogers test. First, it requires judges to critique the artistry of the 
work in order to determine the relevance of the use to the work. Second, even if the use is 
relevant to the work, it continues to require a misleading element. The first prong raises the 
same concerns of subjectivity and unreliability as the Transformative Use test. The second 
prong, while appropriate for balancing First Amendment interests with Lanham Act claims, 
which protect against likelihood of confusion and false, misleading uses, is ill-suited to bal-
ance free speech interests with right-of-publicity claims. 
138  Parks v. Laface Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the Rogers test is 
supported “in the context of other expressive works by comment c of § 47 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that it “look to” Ohio state law and the Third Restatement of Unfair 
Competition to determine whether Tiger Woods has a right-of-publicity claim but adopts the 
Transformative Use test as its balancing approach). But see, Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 
F. Supp. 918, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the use of Seale’s likeness on the inside of a 
musical CD soundtrack was protected by the First Amendment under the Restatement’s Re-
latedness test). 
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in Mark S. Lee’s article, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the 
Right of Publicity—Free Speech Interface:139  
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an 
individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity 
and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some “expressive” 
content in it that might qualify as “speech” in other circumstances. If, on the 
other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive 
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater 
weight.140 
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the court found that the use of the name and 
identity of professional hockey player Anthony “Tony” Twist for a character 
named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli in the Spawn comic book series was 
“predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than an 
artistic or literary expression.”141 In this case, the court rejected other balancing 
tests because of their failure to properly accommodate right-of-publicity inter-
ests.142 After applying the Predominant Use test, the court concluded that the 
right-of-publicity interests outweighed First Amendment interests.143 The court 
appropriately focused on the use of the celebrity’s name and likeness in the 
comic book, not the comic book itself.144  
                                                        
139  Lee, supra note 37, at 500. 
140  Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 37, at 500), aff’d, Doe v. McFarlane, 
207 S.W. 3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming jury award for damages for use of name 
and identity of professional hockey player Anthony “Tony” Twist as comic book character 
Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli). 
141  Id. 
142  Id.  
The weakness of the Restatement’s ‘relatedness’ test and California’s ‘transformative’ test is 
that they give too little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity 
have both expressive and commercial components. These tests operate to preclude a cause of ac-
tion whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its com-
mercial exploitation. Under the relatedness test, use of a person’s name and identity is actionable 
only when the use is solely commercial and is otherwise unrelated to that person. Under the 
transformative test, the transformation or fictionalized characterization of a person’s celebrity 
status is not actionable even if its sole purpose is the commercial use of that person’s name and 
identity. Though these tests purport to balance the prospective interests involved, there is no bal-
ancing at all—once the use is determined to be expressive, it is protected. 
Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. While there has been criticism of the application of the Predominant Use test in this 
particular instance (and the court’s decision as a result of the application of the test), this Ar-
ticle does not agree with the basis of that criticism. See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 167 
(“Remarkably, the court found that the entire comic book Spawn was predominantly an ex-
ploitation of Tony Twist (the hockey player), even though Tony Twist (the character) was a 
minor character in a story about an undead superhero who had been released from Hell.”). 
Professor Rebecca Tushnet observes that the entire book was at issue and the Tony Twist 
character was a minor character in the Spawn story. Id. Yet, she goes on to assume that the 
Missouri Supreme Court was solely persuaded by the promotion of the comic book at hock-
ey events. Id. at 167, n.53. 
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Twist made a submissible case that respondents’ use of his name and identity 
was for a commercial advantage. Nonetheless, there is still an expressive com-
ponent in the use of his name and identity as a metaphorical reference to tough-
guy “enforcers.” And yet, respondents agree (perhaps to avoid a defamation 
claim) that the use was not a parody or other expressive comment or a fictional-
ized account of the real Twist. As such, the metaphorical reference to Twist, 
though a literary device, has very little literary value compared to its commercial 
value.145 
 Ultimately, the court concluded that the predominant purpose for the use of 
the Tony Twist name was to sell comic books and promotional products, not 
make an expressive comment about the hockey player. Therefore, the use was 
not entitled to First Amendment protection.146 The court did not hold that the 
comic book itself, which consisted of expression other than the Twist character, 
was not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. The court was pre-
sented with evidence of commercial use of Twist’s identity beyond the promo-
tion of the comic book at hockey events: (1) Tony Twist, the hockey player, 
submitted evidence suggesting that the defendants marketed their hockey prod-
ucts, which included images of the Tony Twist character, to hockey fans and 
(2) defendants sponsored a “Spawn Night” at a hockey event, where defendant 
Todd McFarlane personally distributed such products. Finally, and probably 
most important, plaintiff submitted evidence of actual diminution of his com-
mercial value as an endorser of products—a former executive of a sports nutri-
tion company “testified that his company withdrew a $100,000 offer to Twist to 
serve as the company’s product endorser after [he] learned that Twist’s name 
was associated with the evil Mafia don in the Spawn comic book.”147 While the 
Tony Twist character may have been a minor part of the comic book, the char-
acter was prominently featured in the promotion of the book and merchandise. 
Further, the promotion and sale of the products, which ultimately and purpose-
fully drew greater attention to the Twist character in the comic book, negatively 
affected the economic value of Tony Twist the hockey player. Damage is pre-
sumed from unauthorized use,148 but this is an instance in which the plaintiff 
actually had evidence of damage.149 The prevention of damage to the economic 
value of a celebrity’s image is the very purpose of right-of-publicity laws. 
Thus, the primary or predominant purpose of the comic book’s use of the Twist 
character was a commercial use. This Article asserts that the court did not err in 
upholding the damages award for the comic book itself.150  
                                                        
145  Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374. 
146  Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W. 3d 52, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
147  Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 367. 
148  MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2. 
149  Id. However, “[i]f plaintiff seeks the recovery of damages, then commercial damage must 
be proved and quantified.” Id. 
150 Doe, 207 S.W. 3d at 76. 
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 Even though Lee’s conception of the test focuses on whether there should 
be First Amendment protection of the “product,”151 here an expressive work, 
the Missouri Supreme Court appropriately narrowed its focus to the protection 
of the use within the product. This Article agrees with the application, particu-
larly when the “product” is an expressive work. If the test is applied in this 
way, it is the most appropriate test for the accommodation of free speech and 
right-of-publicity interests. Unlike the Transformative Use test, it is clear that 
the relevant expressiveness to be analyzed under the Predominant Use test is 
the use, not the work itself. An examination of the context of the use in the bal-
ancing of First Amendment and right-of-publicity interests invites the subjec-
tive, unpredictable critique of the work itself, as evidenced in the multi-step 
process of the Transformative Use test. 
 In addition, the Predominant Use test properly inquires into the mixed ex-
pressive and commercial uses of a person’s identity, rather than placing undue 
focus on the expressive context of the use. It is clear that the test is intended to 
address the complexities of the use of a celebrity’s identity in modern media 
and prevent the First Amendment’s trampling of the right of publicity.  
 The Predominant Use test has been criticized because the approach is 
“primarily concerned with . . . whether the use was commercial” and implicitly 
concludes “that at least some expressive speech has no First Amendment val-
ue.”152 To the contrary, this test properly recognizes that there are often both 
expressive and commercial uses of an identity. The originator of this approach 
stated that the proper inquiry is the subject of the exploitation—the commercial 
value of the celebrity’s identity or expressive commentary on or about the ce-
lebrity.153  
 The Doe court’s application of the Predominant Use test is the appropriate 
test for balancing First Amendment and right-of-publicity interests, including 
persona tattoo publicity cases. The case refines the Predominate Use test—
viewing the use of indicia of the celebrity’s identity (e.g., the tattoo in this case) 
in an expressive work as the potential violation of the right of publicity, not the 
work itself. This refinement best addresses the challenges of assessing mixed 
commercial and expressive uses of a celebrity’s identity and preserves a true 
accommodation of the competing interests. If the predominant use of the tattoo 
is a commercial one, an exploitation of the associative value of the celebrity’s 
identity, then the right of publicity should protect against such use. However, if 
                                                        
151  Lee confirmed that the term “product” set forth in the proposed balancing test set forth in 
his article, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity—Free 
Speech Interface, refers to “the entirety of the work in which someone’s right of publicity 
was used.” E-mail from Mark S. Lee, Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, to Yolanda M. 
King, Assoc. Professor of Law, N. Ill. Univ. Coll. of Law (Mar. 9, 2015, 11:04) (on file with 
author). 
152  Smith, supra note 32, at 2091–92. 
153  Lee, supra note 37, at 500–01. 
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the predominant use of the tattoo is for an expressive purpose, then the First 
Amendment should prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
If a celebrity’s tattoo becomes indicia of that celebrity’s identity, then the 
tattoo is now a part of the protectable right of publicity of that celebrity. Thus, a 
tattoo is a rare instance of a publicity right born from a copyrightable work. A 
celebrity tattoo bearer should be able to bring a right-of-publicity claim based 
on the commercial use of his or her tattoo by a third party. The prevalence of 
tattooing among celebrities, coupled with the growing interest in the commer-
cialization of tattoos, increases the likelihood of this type of right-of-publicity 
lawsuit in the future. Courts should employ the Predominant Use test in order 
to properly accommodate the mixed commercial and expressive uses of a ce-
lebrity’s tattoo and prevent the First Amendment’s eclipsing of the right of pub-
licity. 
